Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019

Externalities in Charitable Crowdfunding
Deserina Sulaeman
Singapore Management University
deserinas.2015@phdis.smu.edu.sg

Abstract
This study examines how the existence of multiple
charitable campaigns supporting similar causes on
the same platform influence the donations received by
each campaign. The existence of multiple campaigns
supporting similar causes can have negative
externalities as they compete for donors. However, the
existence of additional campaigns can also result in
positive externalities as potential donors benefit from
a larger variety of projects to choose from. This study
observes negative and positive externalities from the
existence of multiple campaigns supporting similar
causes. An increase in the number of campaigns leads
to a decrease in the average donation received by each
campaign, indicating that the additional campaigns do
not necessarily expand the market. However, when
some of the campaigns perform exceptionally well,
other campaigns – including non-top performing
campaigns – receive more donation, highlighting the
market expansion effect of the presence of successful
campaigns on a platform.

1. Introduction
Crowdfunding has transformed charitable
fundraising practices [8]. Charitable fundraisers, even
inexperienced ones, can now start new charitable
campaigns on crowdfunding platforms and reach a
large set of potential donors around the world at low
fundraising costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that
more and more charitable fundraisers turn to
crowdfunding platforms as a viable fundraising
channel in the recent years. Indeed, GoFundMe, a
charity-focused crowdfunding platform and the focus
of this study, is the fourth-ranked crowdfunding
platform based on site traffics as recorded by
Alexa.com [12]. It trails only Kickstarter, Indiegogo,
1

Some campaigns on GoFundMe support causes that are not
typically associated with charities, such as funding memorial funds
for an individual, funding a personal trip, funding a wedding, etc.
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and Patreon, which are not charity-focused.
Fundraisers on GoFundMe have raised more than US$
3 billion since the platform’s inception in 2010 [1].
With the increasing popularity of charitable
fundraising on crowdfunding platforms, many
charitable crowdfunding campaigns are likely to share
similar causes – that is, supporting the relief efforts
associated with a particular natural disaster event – on
the same platform. Indeed, the dataset utilized in this
study includes at least 850 campaigns posted on
GoFundMe in support of the relief efforts of victims
of Hurricane Matthew that made its landfall in South
Carolina, USA on October 8, 2016. Similarly, over
2,600 campaigns were posted on GoFundMe in
response to Hurricane Harvey that made its landfall in
the Texas Gulf Coast on August 25, 2017. This study
examines how the existence of multiple charitable
campaigns supporting similar causes on the same
crowdfunding platform influence the donations
received by these campaigns.
This study examines campaigns aiming to support
relief efforts of natural disaster events. This focus has
two benefits.
First, the analyses mitigate the
(potentially large) variation in the worthiness of causes
supported by various campaigns on charitable crowdfunding platforms.1 The campaigns examined in this
study share the same focus of natural disaster relief
efforts, and therefore their causes are quite similar.
Second, this focus allows for comparisons with
findings from studies on competition in markets where
corporations or institutions offer similar products (i.e.,
products that are close substitutes) and compete
against each other for buyers.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study
to examine how the presence of other charitable
campaigns influences the success of campaigns on
crowdfunding platforms. Specifically, this study
investigate whether the presence of other campaigns
supporting similar causes result in both positive and
negative externalities.
An example of such campaigns is
https://www.gofundme.com/AmieeVacationFunds.
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Existing studies on other markets have
documented that the presence of additional firms have
negative externalities (e.g., [11]). These negative
externalities stem from business stealing among firms
in that market. In the charitable crowdfunding context,
faced with budget constraints, donors are unlikely to
contribute to all campaigns with similar causes. As a
result, these campaigns compete against each other for
potential donors’ money.
However, existing studies have also identified a
potential channel of positive externalities (e.g., [2],
[3], [7], [10], [15], and [16]). Crowdfunding platforms
are two-sided markets, in which agents from one side
of the market benefit from increased interactions with
agents from the other side of the market, creating
positive cross-group externality ([3] and [15]) that
potentially increases the size of the market.
In the charitable crowdfunding context, more
donors may be attracted to a particular platform when
the number of campaigns that donors can choose from
in that platform increases. The additional campaigns
offer a larger variety of projects that potential donors
can choose from. However, the larger variety does not
necessarily mean that donors would have an easier
time identifying campaigns that maximize their
utilities. In order to increase their chances of finding
such campaigns, donors would be looking for signals
that a platform hosts high-quality campaigns. When
top campaigns on a platform perform particularly well,
potential donors are likely to use this as a quality
signal, not only of those top campaigns, but also of the
overall quality of campaigns hosted on that platform
[16].
The empirical analyses in this study include two
sets of control variables to mitigate potential
endogeneity concerns. First, to capture time-invariant
heterogeneity across campaigns, campaign fixed
effects are included in all analyses at the campaign
level. Second, a vector of control variables are
included in the empirical model. To the extent that this
vector includes relevant factors that may affect both
campaign outcomes and the presence of additional
campaigns, the inclusion of these control variables
helps to mitigate potential omitted variable concerns.
This study observes both negative and positive
externalities from the presence of other charitable
campaigns supporting similar causes on the donations
received by each campaign. This study finds that an
increase in the number of campaigns supporting relief
efforts for a particular natural disaster event leads to
less donation received by those campaigns. This is
consistent with the business stealing effects of
additional campaigns. This observed negative
externality suggests that market expansion does not

occur merely because more campaigns supporting
similar causes are available on the platform.
However, when the top performing campaigns
supporting relief efforts for a particular natural disaster
event perform exceptionally well in obtaining
donations or social media mentions (relative to other
campaigns sharing the same event), other campaigns
supporting relief efforts for the same event receive
more donations. This finding is consistent with the
quality-based market expansion hypothesis presented
in [10] and [16]. This positive externality is
experienced by a wide range of campaigns, including
non-top performing campaigns. This indicates that
market expansion occurs when the top campaigns
perform exceptionally well relative to other campaigns
on the platform.
A further analysis of the market shares of topperforming versus non-top performing campaigns
indicates that neither the positive nor negative
externalities has a significant effect on the distribution
of donations among the top performing campaigns.
However, for the non-top performing campaigns,
while they receive more donations when the top
performing campaigns perform exceptionally well,
they still lose some of their market shares.

2. Hypotheses development
Existing studies have documented both negative
and positive externalities from new entrants (e.g., [2],
[3], [7], [10], [11], [15], and [16]). A study of peer-topeer microloans by [11] documented a negative effect
of the presence of other campaigns, particularly
among close substitutes, on funding speed. Their
findings suggest that similar projects on a peer-to-peer
microloan platform are stealing lenders from one
another.
Using charitable donors’ utility function posited by
[14], we assume that donors on charitable
crowdfunding platforms receive positive utility from
two sources: (1) from the joy of making a donation
(i.e., warm glow or joy-of-giving) and (2) from the
improvement of the well-being of the beneficiaries as
the results of the benefits delivered by the fundraisers
(i.e., altruism). However, each donor’s ability to
maximize her/his utility is limited by her/his budget
constraint. Given these constraints, donors are
unlikely to contribute to all campaigns providing them
with positive utility. As a result, campaigns will have
to compete with one another to get their donations.
Therefore, we expect:
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Hypothesis 1 (Negative Externalities):
An
increase in the number of campaigns supporting
similar causes on the same platform leads to less
donation received by each of those campaigns.
In the context of two-sided markets, such as
crowdfunding platforms, agents from one side of the
market benefit from their interactions with agents from
the other side of the market and vice versa. This
positive cross-group externality, as posited by [3] and
[15], implies that as the number of agents from one
side of the market increases, the number of agents
from the other side is likely to increase. As such, the
market can expand as a result of new entrants into the
market. Assuming that the size of the donors’ market
is endogenous, [2] posited that the entries of additional
non-governmental organizations (NGO) can “wake”
additional potential donors through increased
collective fundraising efforts. Consistent with this
hypothesis, [7] found that entry by high quality movie
theaters attracts new patrons to the theaters.
[10] and [16] posit that the quality of the agents
from one side of the market also matters in attracting
more agents from the other side of the market to the
platform. When potential buyers observe the presence
of some high quality sellers on a particular platform,
they revise their beliefs regarding the quality of all
sellers on that particular platform upwards. [16] argues
that low quality sellers will not enter a platform
dominated by high quality sellers because of the
potential cost faced by low quality sellers if their true
quality is later revealed to the buyers. As such,
potential buyers prefer to transact in a platform
dominated by high quality sellers as it increases their
likelihood of finding campaigns that maximize their
utilities [10].
In this context, the presence of more campaigns
may expand the potential donors market, which leads
to higher donations received by each campaign on the
platform. Consistent with [10] and [16], such market
expansion is likely to occur in the presence of high
quality campaigns. In most cases, the quality of a
campaign is not fully revealed to potential donors. In
these cases, donors may look at campaigns’
performance in raising funds as a signal of quality [4].
When campaigns on a platform – particularly top
campaigns, which are the most visible to potential
donors – are doing exceptionally well in raising funds
they send a signal of a good quality. This signal spills
over to the platform and by extension to other
campaigns on the platform, which then attracts more
potential donors.
As such, we can expect that when the top
campaigns on a platform are performing exceptionally
well donors market on the platform is expanded. In this

study, the performance of the top campaigns is
measured using the portion of the donations received
by the top 25% of highest earning campaigns over the
donations received by all campaigns supporting the
relief efforts to help victims of a particular natural
disaster event of top earning campaigns on a particular
platform.
Hypothesis 2 (Positive Externalities): When the
top earning campaigns supporting relief efforts of
a particular event receive more donations relative
to the rest of the campaigns associated with the
same event, campaigns associated with that same
event receive more donations.

3. Data description
This study utilizes a panel dataset containing
charitable campaigns on GoFundMe that help victims
of natural disaster events. Python codes were utilized
to collect publicly available data daily from
GoFundMe’s website, www.gofundme.com, in 2016
and 2017. The panel dataset contains daily data for at
least 50 days after the occurrence of each event of
7,899 unique charitable campaigns helping victims of
five major natural disaster events: Hurricane Matthew
(September 2016), Hurricane Harvey (August 2017),
Hurricane Irma (September 2017), Hurricane Maria
(September 2017), and Mexico City earthquake
(September 2017).
When queried for a specific natural disaster event,
GoFundMe displays at most 500 campaigns related to
that event. These displayed campaigns seem to be the
most active (i.e., still receiving donations) among
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the
corresponding natural disaster event. For our analyses,
we focus on campaigns that appear on the list
displayed by GoFundMe on the previous day t-1. This
approach allows us to measure the donations received
on day t as the difference between the total donation
amount in day t and the total donation amount in day
t-1. Therefore, the analysis in this study employs at
most 500 campaigns during each day following a
particular natural disaster.
However, we use all campaigns supporting similar
causes that have appeared on GoFundMe’s list thus far
to calculate the independent variables of interest:
number of campaigns and the ratios of high- vs. lowperforming campaigns. We do this as donors can still
access each active campaign, including those not
appearing on GoFundMe’s list, using a direct link to
the campaign’s page. Moreover, donors who have
donated to unlisted campaigns can continue to be
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advocates for those campaigns as well as the
GoFundMe platform.
The charitable crowdfunding campaigns in the
dataset raised a total of US$ 35.9 million from 327,004
donors by the end of the data collection periods (see
Table 1). The dataset includes at least 50 days after the
occurrence of each event. The data on Hurricane
Matthew, Hurricane Maria, and Mexico City
earthquake cover 50 days since the occurrence of each
event. The data on Hurricane Harvey cover 57 days
after the hurricane made its landfall in Texas. The data
on Hurricane Irma cover 59 days since its landfall in
Florida. Campaigns on GoFundMe can stay open for a
long time even after their funding goals are reached.
However, the 50-days observation window seems
sufficient to capture the campaigns’ life cycle. As
shown on Figure 1, over 87% of the total amounts of
donations were received within the first 30 days of the
occurrence of the events in our dataset. These
campaigns do not receive much donations anymore
beyond 30 days after the occurrence of the events they
are associated with. Therefore, the 50-day window
includes the active period (i.e., first 30 days after the
occurrence of each event) as well as the non-active
period (i.e., beyond day 30) of fundraising for victims
of natural disaster events.
Similarly, Figure 2 shows that most campaigns
entered the market within the first 10 days of the
occurrence of the events they are associated with. Over
97% of campaigns in our dataset entered the market
within the first 30 days of the occurrence of the events
in the dataset. This implies that within the same event,
most campaigns are of similar age. The relatively short
active period of fundraising is consistent with the
urgent nature of natural disaster relief efforts and the
short attention span given to such events.

Additionally, the Google Trends index for each of
the natural disaster events in the dataset is used to
capture the differences in the popularity of those
events. Google Trends index is calculated using query
share, which is the search volume for a particular
query term divided by the total search volume on
Google at a given point in time [5]. The Google Trends
index of a particular natural disaster event can be
utilized as a proxy for how popular that event is
because the index represents the relative volume of
search for that particular event.

Figure 1. Total donations received,
by event and time

Table 1. Campaign Statistics, by event
Event

Date

Number of
Campaigns

Total
Donations

Total
Donors

Hurricane
Matthew

10/16

850

$3,007,368

31,214

Hurricane
Harvey

08/17

2,627

$19,220,782

169,954

Hurricane
Irma

09/17

2,516

$7,110,700

61,925

Hurricane
Maria

09/17

1,906

$6,624,402

63,911

Mexico City
earthquake

09/17

133

$274,669

2,905

$35,963,252

327,004

Total

7,899

Figure 2. Number of campaigns,
by event and time

4. Empirical model
The presence of other charitable campaigns
supporting similar causes can have both negative and
positive externalities for all campaigns with similar
causes. The empirical model in Equation 1 is used to
test for the existence of negative and positive
externalities as specified in Hypotheses 1 and 2.
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𝑙𝑛 𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅𝑐𝑣 , = 𝛼 ∗ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑠
+𝛼 ∗ 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
+Β∗𝑋 +Θ∗𝑍+𝜀

(1)

The dependent variable in the empirical model in
Equation 1 (DonationRcvt,i) is the amount of donations
(in US Dollars) received by campaign i at time t. The
first independent variable of interest is the number of
campaigns supporting the relief efforts of the same
natural disaster as campaign i (NumCampaignst) at
time t. The second independent variable of interest is
EarnRatiot-1, the ratio of the total donations received
by the top 25% highest earning campaigns supporting
the relief efforts of a specific natural disaster event on
a particular day over the total donations received by all
campaigns focusing on that event on the same day.
While the top 25% campaigns are identified daily, the
grouping seems to be quite stable across consecutive
days.
Two sets of control variables are included to
mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. First, to
capture
time-invariant
heterogeneity
across
campaigns, campaign fixed effects (Z) are included in
the model. As the success of each campaign can
depend on its own characteristics as well as the
characteristics of the disaster event it is associated
with, it is crucial to include campaign fixed effects.
Second, a vector of control variables are included
in the empirical model (X) to mitigate potential
omitted variable concerns. These control variables
include (1) the Google Trends index of the natural
disaster event associated with campaign i (GTrends) at
time t-1, (2) donations received in the previous time
period (DonationRcv at t-1), and (3) a binary indicator
for the first five days since the occurrence of another
natural disaster event (NewEvent).
The Google Trends index of the natural disaster
event associated with campaign i (GTrends) is
included to capture the popularity of the event which
may affect the number of potential donors willing to
help and the amount of money these donors willing to
give to help victims of that particular natural disaster
event. It is important to capture the relative popularity
of the event in the model to avoid potential
endogeneity issue caused by omitted variable biased.
More specifically, it is possible that the number of
campaigns supporting similar causes and the relative
performance of the top campaigns are both driven by
the popularity of the particular event associated with
these campaigns. The Google Trend index of a natural
disaster event is suitable to capture the relative
attention received by the event, potentially reflecting
the volume of news coverage on that event. Hence, the
inclusion of the Google Trend index in the model also
alleviate the concern regarding the potential effects of
news coverage on the number of campaigns

supporting the relief efforts for a particular event and
the performance of those campaigns.
The donations received in the previous day is
included in the model to control for campaign i’s own
momentum from the previous day. The NewEvent
binary indicator variable is included in the model to
examine the effect of a new natural disaster event
during the 50-days fundraising period captured in the
dataset. In particular, the NewEvent variable captures
the potential effect of the arrival of a new disaster
event that attract public interests and can detract
potential donors’ attention from the focal event. Table
2 displays the summary statistics of the variables
included in the model.
The empirical model in Equation 1 is estimated
using a panel regression method with campaign fixed
effects. Event and time period clustering is also used
in the regression to control for within-time-period and
within-event correlation.
Table 2. Variables Summary Statistics
Variable
DonationRcvt
EarnRatiot-1
NumCampaignst
Gtrendst-1

Mean
$169
0.88
1890
6.79

Std. Dev.
$1,793
0.10
750
17.89

5. Main results
First, the model in Equation 1 is estimated at an
aggregate level. More specifically, we aggregated our
dataset based on five natural disaster events across at
least 50 time periods for each event. Table 3 shows the
regression estimates using the aggregated dataset.
The positive estimate for EarnRatio indicates that
the relative success of the top 25% of campaigns based
on donations received has positive externalities on the
total donations received by all campaigns supporting
relief efforts for a particular natural disaster event in
the next day. This result suggests that the success of
the top campaigns supporting relief efforts of a
particular event is likely to bring in more potential
donors to that cause on a platform. Donors who
contributed to those top campaigns can reach out to
other potential donors and become advocates (i.e.,
providing additional publicity) for the cause and the
platform.
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Table 3. The effects of other campaigns,
aggregated by event
EarnRatio (t-1)
NumCampaigns (t)
Observations
R-squared

Log(DonationsRcv)
17.309***
(5.0971)
0.002
(0.0020)
240
0.532

Figure 3 shows that the positive effect of the
relative success of the top earning campaigns is
decreasing over time. However, this positive effect
stays persistent for more than a week indicating that
all campaigns supporting relief efforts for a particular
natural disaster event continue to benefit from the
relative success of the top earning campaigns.

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Coefficients for event fixed effects are
suppressed. Control variables are included in the regression,
but their estimates are suppressed.

Table 4 shows the regression estimates using the
non-aggregated dataset (i.e., across campaigns and
time periods). The results show that on average each
campaign is both positively and negatively affected by
the existence of other campaigns supporting relief
efforts for the same natural disaster event.
Specifically, the results in Table 4 indicate that an
increase in the number of campaigns supporting relief
efforts for a particular natural disaster event
(NumCampaigns) leads to less donations received by
each campaign with similar causes (DonationRcv) on
average, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
The positive estimate for EarnRatio in Table 4
indicates that the relative success of the top earning
campaigns on a particular day has positive
externalities on other campaigns supporting relief
efforts for the same event on the subsequent day. This
result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. These results
suggest that market expansion occurs only when some
campaigns raising funds for relief efforts of a
particular disaster event perform exceptionally well
compared to other campaigns associated with the same
event, consistent with [10] and [16]. A mere increase
in the number of campaigns do not appear to expand
the donors market. Instead, it has a negative effect on
the amount of donations received by these campaigns.
Table 4. The effects of other campaigns
EarnRatio (t-1)
NumCampaigns (t)
Observations
R-squared

Log(DonationsRcv)
22.193***
(2.8603)
-0.012***
(0.0011)
86,678
0.522

Figure 3. Coefficient estimates for EarnRatio
for different time lag
Now the question is whether the existence of other
campaigns with similar causes affect top performing
campaigns versus low performing campaigns
differently. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the estimates
for the top 25% highest earning campaigns and
column 2 of Table 5 shows the estimates for the
bottom 75% lowest earning campaigns.
The results in Table 5 shows that negative and
positive externalities are experienced by top earning
campaigns as well as low earning campaigns.
However, the negative externalities from an increased
in the number of campaigns supporting relief efforts
for the same event seems to be stronger for the top
earning campaigns.
As expected, the relative success of top earning
campaigns has positive externalities on those
campaigns themselves on the subsequent day (column
1 of Table 5). However, more interestingly, positive
externalities for other campaigns – i.e., campaigns
with relatively weak performance so far – are
observed. Specifically, the low performing campaigns
also benefit from the relative success of top earning
campaigns (column 2 of Table 5).

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Coefficients for campaign fixed
effects are suppressed. Control variables are included
in the regression, but their estimates are suppressed.
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Table 5. The effects of other campaigns,
for top versus bottom earning campaigns

Table 6. The effects of other campaigns
on donation shares

Top 25%
Bottom 75%
earners
earners
Log(DonationsRcv)
37.916***
11.942***
(5.4313)
(3.5875)
-0.013***
-0.009***
(0.0014)
(0.0011)
45,010
41,668
0.539
0.423

Top 25%
Bottom 75%
earners
earners
DonationShare
0.012
-0.004**
(0.0105)
(0.0018)
-0.000**
-0.000**
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
44,672
40,455
0.268
0.136

EarnRatio (t-1)
NumCampaigns (t)
Observations
R-squared

EarnRatio (t-1)
NumCampaigns (t)
Observations
R-squared

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Coefficients for campaign fixed effects are
suppressed. Control variables are included in the regression, but
their estimates are suppressed.

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Coefficients for campaign fixed effects are
suppressed. Control variables are included in the regression, but
their estimates are suppressed.

The regressions also include various control
variables, whose parameter estimates are suppressed
in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The arrivals of new disaster
events do not significantly affect the donations
received by top performing campaigns. However,
these arrivals negatively affect the donations received
by the non-top performing campaigns. This suggests
that when a new natural disaster occurs, potential
donors become less likely to support campaigns
related to existing events that have not been
performing well.

The results in column 1 of Table 6 suggest that the
presence of other campaigns supporting similar cause
does not significantly alter the distribution of
donations across top earning campaigns supporting
relief efforts for a particular event. Furthermore, the
distribution of donations across these top performing
campaigns is also not affected by the relative success
of these top performing campaigns.
In contrast, the results in column 2 of Table 6
indicate that the market shares of the low performing
campaigns are negatively affected by the relative
success of the top earning campaigns. It appears that
while the low performing campaigns benefit from the
relative performance of the top earning campaigns (see
column 2 of Table 5), these low performing campaigns
lose some of their market shares to the top performing
campaigns.

6. Additional results
One may also ask whether the existence of other
campaigns affects the distribution of donations across
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the same
natural disaster event. More specifically, one may ask
how the existence of other campaigns supporting
similar causes affects the market share (will be called
donation share, henceforth) of each campaign.
Table 6 shows the regression estimates for the
empirical model in Equation 1 with a different
dependent variable. In the modified specification, the
share of donations (DonationShare) that a campaign
has received thus far is used as the dependent variable.
DonationShare is defined following the market share
definition in [6], which is the portion of the total
donations received by campaigns supporting a
particular set of causes that is received by a particular
campaign supporting one of those causes. By using
donation share as a dependent variable in the model,
we can examine whether the presence of other
campaigns change how total donations for a particular
event are distributed across campaigns supporting
relief efforts for that event within the same platform.

7. Robustness tests
7.1. Alternate
performance

measure

of

campaigns’

Table 7 shows the regression estimates for another
alternative specification of the empirical model in
Equation 1. Social networks have been documented by
existing studies to influence the success of noncharitable crowdfunding projects (e.g., [9], [13]).
Donors who have contributed to campaigns on a
particular platform can reach out to their social
networks through various means of communication,
including social media, advocating the platform as a
viable channel for supporting charitable causes. This
advocacy can increase the public awareness of the
platform as a channel for charitable contributions.
In this modified model, MentionRatio is used to
capture the relative popularity of the top endorsed
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campaigns in Facebook mentions and Twitter tweets
on a particular day. MentionRatio is defined as the
ratio of the total number of social media mentions
received by the top endorsed campaigns supporting
similar causes on a particular day over the total amount
of social media mentions received by all campaigns
supporting these causes on that day.2 The Facebook
mentions and Twitter tweets received by the top
endorsed campaigns can help advocate for the causes
supported by those campaigns and the platform as a
viable channel for supporting those causes.
The negative and positive externalities observed
previously remains robust in this modified model.
Similar to the results in Table 4, the positive estimate
for MentionRatio indicates that the relative success of
the top endorsed campaigns in getting mentioned on
social media has positive externalities on all
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the same
natural disaster event.
Table 7. The effects of other campaigns,
using an alternate measure of campaigns’
performance
MentionRatio (t-1)
NumCampaigns (t)
Observations
R-squared

Log(DonationsRcv)
20.571***
(2.6242)
-0.011***
(0.0010)
86,678
0.523

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for
campaign fixed effects are suppressed. Control
variables are included in the regression, but their
estimates are suppressed.

7.2. Alternate specification on top and bottom
performing campaigns
The robustness of this study’s main results in Table
4 is also checked by changing the specification for top
earning campaigns. In this alternate specification, top
earning campaigns are defined as the top 40% of
campaigns with the highest donations received thus
far. As such, EarnRatio40 is the ratio of the total
donations received by the top 40% highest earning
campaigns supporting the relief efforts of a specific
natural disaster event on a particular day over the total
donations received by all campaigns focusing on that
event on the same day. Additionally, I use a subset of
the original dataset containing only the top 40%
2

Top endorsed campaigns are defined as campaigns that receive
daily social media mentions that are in the top 25% of all

highest earning campaigns and the lowest 40% earning
campaigns of the day in this regression. The middle
20% of campaigns are not included in this regression
to exclude the effects on the 20% campaigns in the
middle from the results.
The results in Table 8 shows that the direction and
statistical significance of our variable of interests
remain robust with this alternate specification of top
earning campaign using the subset of dataset
containing only the top and bottom 40% of campaigns
based on the total donations they have received.
Table 8. The effects of other campaigns
using an alternate specification of top
earning campaigns and subset dataset
EarnRatio40 (t-1)
NumCampaigns (t)
Observations
R-squared

Log(DonationsRcv)
49.219***
(5.7025)
-0.015***
(0.0012)
71,235
0.524

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for
campaign fixed effects are suppressed. Control
variables are included in the regression, but their
estimates are suppressed.

8. Discussion and future directions
This study finds both negative and positive
externalities from the existence of other charitable
campaigns supporting relief efforts for the same
natural disaster event on the same platform. An
increase in the number of campaigns supporting relief
efforts for a particular event on the same
crowdfunding platform leads to less donations
received by those campaigns on the following day.
This finding is consistent with the business stealing
effects of additional campaigns.
However, when the top performing campaigns (in
terms of donations or social media mentions) are
performing exceptionally well, other campaigns
supporting relief efforts for the same event on the same
platform receive more donations on the following day.
This study finds that the top performing campaigns are
not the only ones benefiting from their good
performance on the previous day. The low performing
campaigns also benefit from abnormally good
performance of the top campaigns. Our findings
campaigns supporting a set of similar causes (i.e., relief efforts in
response to a specific natural disaster event).
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suggest that this positive externality of the abnormally
good performing of the top campaigns appear to be
fairly persistence over time.
This study also finds that the presence of other
campaigns does not change how the donations are
distributed across the top performing campaigns.
However, the presence of other campaigns seems to
reduce the donation share of the low performing
campaigns. In other words, the low performing
campaigns seem to lose the proportion of the total
donations received by all campaigns supporting relief
efforts for a particular natural disaster event even
though these low performing campaigns receive more
donations as a result of abnormally good performance
of the top campaigns.
This study contributes to the literature on
crowdfunding by documenting that the existence of
multiple campaigns supporting similar causes on the
same platform can generate externalities for other
campaigns on that platform. An increase in the number
of campaigns generates negative externality in the
form of lower average donations. This negative effect
suggests that a mere increase in the number of
campaigns does not expand the donors’ market.
The expansion of the donors market, in the form of
more donations, appear to occur when the top
campaigns supporting a particular cause perform
exceptionally well. The positive effect of the
exceptionally good performance of the top campaigns
appears to benefit all campaigns, including the low
performing ones.
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